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Abstract - EN 
Lidl Shop&Go solution is an innovative self-scanning service being tested in Por-
tuguese stores in a pilot phase. The aim of this project is to evaluate an added 
risk exposure of the solution itself and its impact on existent infrastructure from 
Information Security (IS) perspective. To succeed, a review of Risk Assessment 
(RA) frameworks is performed and Octave Allegro method is selected as the best 
fit for purpose. The findings of the RA are classified according to their expected 
probability, business impact, information asset profile and container the infor-
mation resides in. In the end of the assessment, a suggestion of mitigation 
measures is presented. In addition to Octave method, these measures are prior-
itized according to their implementation effort and impact on the number of Threat 
Scenarios. The resulting list of findings is used together with other evaluation 
criteria to assess the full-scale deployment of SHOP&GO project in future by 
management. Main identified topics for improvement are secure communication, 
improvements in physical security policy, password and patch management revi-
sion and awareness of the store personnel / IT personnel. The output of this pro-
ject can be used as a reference by organizations within the industry, which are 
planning any similar type of deployment. As this RA involves only the first itera-
tion, its results are sufficiently generic and applicable to other sites and projects 
with the same scope. 
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Resumo - PT 
A solução Shop & Go da Lidl é um serviço inovador de self-checkout testado em 
lojas portuguesas em fase piloto. O objetivo deste projeto é avaliar a exposição 
de risco acrescentada que a solução traz juntamente com o seu impacto na 
infraestrutura existente na perspectiva da Segurança de Informação. Para o 
projecto suceder foi feita uma revisão de frameworks de avaliação de risco e o 
método Octave Allegro selecionado como a melhor solução para o efeito. As 
conclusões da avaliação de risco são classificadas de acordo com a 
probabilidade esperada, o impacto no negócio, o perfil de ativos de informações 
e o contentor em que a informação reside. No final da avaliação, é apresentada 
uma sugestão de medidas de mitigação. Além do método Octave, essas medidas 
são priorizadas de acordo com o esforço de implementação e o impacto no 
número de cenários de ameaças. A lista de resultados resultante é usada em 
conjunto com os outros critérios de avaliação para avaliar a implementação em 
grande escala do projeto SHOP & GO no futuro. Os principais tópicos 
identificados para melhoria são comunicação segura, melhorias na política de 
segurança física, revisão de gestão de passwords e patches e consciência do 
pessoal da loja / pessoal de TI. Os resultados deste projeto podem ser usados 
como referência por organizações do setor, que estão planear qualquer tipo de 
implementação similar. Como esta avaliação de risco envolve apenas a primeira 
iteração, os seus resultados são suficientemente genéricos e aplicáveis a outros 
locais e projetos com o mesmo âmbito.  





Information security is a kind of risk that is transversal to IT and business areas 
in an organization. This fact is accepted by the majority of organizations, but few 
of them effectively align their risk management policies from IT and functional 
areas. It is not a common practice to apply transversal risk assessment and man-
agement policies to the organization as a whole. (Aven, 2016) 
Lidl Group is a multinational organization with its Headquarters based in Neck-
arsulm, Germany. It unites more than 10.000 stores in 30 countries worldwide. A 
SHOP&GO is a developing self-scanning solution for Lidl customers in the stores 
– a customer may use his smartphone for item scanning via built-in camera and 
check out in a more rapid way than at conventional POS. Currently, several coun-
tries participate in the pilot phase of the SHOP&GO, Portugal is one of them. This 
paper describes the process of risk assessment and management recommenda-
tions applied to the SHOP&GO project itself, and the attack vectors it adds to an 
existent store infrastructure.  
SHOP&GO rollout adds multiple information containers and infrastructure de-
vices to the baseline configuration of Lidl store. The scope of this study is limited 
to this added value – added attack vectors through such devices to existent criti-
cal information assets at Lidl, like GDPR compliant personal data or PCI DSS 
compliant payment data, among others.  
Lidl International has well defined internal risk assessment policies with proper 
tools, but as any tools, they have their limitations. First of all, they are IT asset-
oriented, and not information oriented. Secondly, the results produced by these 
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tools are not granular enough for comparison purposes between assets what 
makes a decision making the process difficult.  
This project's aim is to select the proper framework and apply it to SHOP&GO 
project, providing a comprehensive review of its strengths and weaknesses from 
IS perspective. To achieve this goal, an analysis of existing methodologies 
(frameworks) is performed, based on studies and support documents of the initial 
selection of frameworks. Practical output, or main investigation question, is the 
evaluation of to what extent the implementation of SHOP&GO leverages the risk 
exposure of the organization. And what can be done to mitigate possible risks 
and with what effort. The collateral output of this study is the review of evaluated 
risk assessment frameworks and selection of the best fit for SHOP&GO risk as-
sessment. By using the chosen framework I highlight some strong points and 
limitations of it as well. 
 
Current State of Risk Assessment Methodologies 
 
“Risk and risk assessments are a key piece of any successful, comprehensive 
security strategy. They substantially help in determining what is most valuable 
and at the most risk, and can often help to determine what must be done to re-
duce those risks.” (Visintine, 2003) 
Risk assessment and risk management are established as a scientific field 
and provide important contributions in supporting decision-making in practice. 
Basic principles, theories and methods exist and are developing in a continu-
ous improvement process (Aven, 2016). 
S.Shapovalov Self-Scanning Solution in Retail: Risk Assessment 8 
8 
 
In information security, a risk can be defined as the probability that a particular 
threat-source will exercise (accidentally trigger or intentionally exploit) normally 
based on a particular information security vulnerability and the resulting impact 
(Elky, 2006). Although, the scientific foundation of risk assessment and risk 
management is still somewhat shaky on some issues and researchers still ar-
gue on the very concept of risk itself– whether the probability approach in risk 
evaluation should be used at all. There is a shift happening from rather narrow 
perspectives based on probabilities to ways of thinking which highlight events, 
consequences and uncertainties (Aven 2012, 2016). This shift, however, is still 
being studied and its benefits or drawbacks are unclear on the frameworks 
discussed below.  
In regard to Risk Assessment and Management frameworks themselves, there 
is a vast majority of tools available for today’s analyst, free and paid, with gov-
ernment or private sector origins (National Cyber Security Center, 2016). Their 
structure differs significantly, as ones were born before, or gave origin to the 
others, as well as adopted different output objectives (e.g. quantitative vs qual-
itative) (The Open Group, 2009). There are several existing studies aiming to 
compare the most known frameworks, both within industry and academia.  
One of the most complex evaluations was performed by Gartner analysts 
Tomhave & Heidt (2017) regarding the available RA methodologies on the mar-
ket. Although without clear top pick definition, it provides an important input of 
features used in framework analysis. Frameworks were evaluated on their type 
and ease of use, support materials, time on the market among other criteria. 
The main conclusion the researchers derive is that qualitatively, there is not a 
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great difference in terms of how all of the methods function. The most important 
factor is so-called cultural fit. The researchers agree that every method on their 
list, when well performed, will lead to a similar result, as long as it fits analyst 
and organization profile. Another important conclusion derived is the conver-
gence of all methods being analyzed to ISO 31000 (Tomhave & Heidt, 2017). 
Another research held in academia did the similar analysis and applied the top 
3 selected frameworks to the case study, for comparable results. They ended 
up by selecting OCTAVE, IRAM and IT-Grundschutz as the most representative 
sample of existent model’s universe. The authors admit, however, that selection 
was subjective and accept the fact that dropped models (Mehari, MAGERIT and 
EBIOS) were excellent candidates as well. The initial universe was composed 
of 22 models (Macedo & Silva, 2009).  
Another evaluation work worth to mention was performed in 2013 and analyzed 
the methods used by OCTAVE, IRAM and IT-Grundschutz (Haritha et al, 2013). 
Although last two researches are quite outdated, their results remain valid for 
selection purposes as none of the 3 frameworks suffered major updates since 
the publication.  
Common frameworks referenced by authors of these studies were selected to 
be part of initial framework list to be put in practice with given problem. Features 
attributed by authors were considered in the process of final framework selec-
tion, along with support documentation every method provide. The following list 
was defined for initial triage. Every tool listed in it is considered to be mature 
and is being used both by business and academia (ISACA, 2017).  
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• ISO 31000: Risk management – Principles and guidelines, establishes a 
number of principles that need to be satisfied to make risk management effec-
tive (ISO, 2009). 
• ISACA COBIT 5: COBIT (formerly Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technology) version 5 is a product of ISACA (formerly Information Sys-
tems Audit and Control Association) (ISACA, 2017).  
• Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR): a quantitative risk analysis 
method originally created by Jack Jones (CXOWARE), now a standard from 
The Open Group (FAIR Institute, 2017). 
• MAGERIT: Methodology for Information Systems Risk Analysis and Man-
agement, a Spanish standard mandated for use by all government agencies 
(ENISA, 2017).  
• NIST SP 800-30: U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2012).  
• OCTAVE Allegro: developed by Carnegie Mellon University Software En-
gineering Institute’s CERT Division; provides a comprehensive risk assessment 
framework with details about performing risk analysis and includes the ability to 
incorporate other risk analysis methods (Caralli et al, 2007).  
The terms used in this study include risk analysis, assessment and manage-
ment. The workflow of complete risk management program follows the same 
direction – risk analysis gives inputs for risk assessment, which enables further 
management of given risk.  




I. Compared Features 
To compare the list of frameworks a feature list was defined. They are: 
a.) Type of tool -  method / framework - complete risk assessment, analysis 
and management framework; or analysis method. Framework defines an overall 
risk management process, mostly at macro level, including risk assessment and 
analysis. (e.g. COBIT 5). Method typically is focused on performing a specific 
set of analysis functions, with good set of instructions, thus more focused on mi-
cro level. (e.g. FAIR) 
b.) Type of assessment – qualitative vs quantitative (or mixed).  
Quantitative risk measurement is easily represented in monetary terms and 
comprehensive for public. Quantitative risk measurement is the standard way of 
measuring risk in many fields, such as insurance, but it is not commonly used to 
measure risk in information systems. Two of the reasons claimed for this are 1) 
the difficulties in identifying and assigning a value to assets, and 2) the lack of 
statistical information that would make it possible to determine frequency (Vis-
intine, 2003). ISO organization defines that, most of the risk assessment tools 
that are used today for information systems are measurements of qualitative 
risk (International Standard Organization, 2017). Another consideration when 
comparing qualitative to quantitative is the ability to produce meaningful output 
for key users and stakeholders: Qualitative methods tend to produce results 
such as “high, medium, and low” which can be hard to interpret, as opposed to 
clear quantitative (normally financial) representation (Tomhave, 2014). 
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c.) Existence of support materials and specialized tools. 
OCTAVE Method, for example, comes with spreadsheets to support its process. 
FAIR, as well, has a selection of automated tools. 
d.) Special skills required or Method flexibility. The more prescriptive meth-
ods are designed for a general audience without special or extensive 
knowledge on a subject. The more flexible methods typically require customiza-
tion and therefore depend on more experienced risk analysts and training 
(Tomhave, 2014). 
e.) Preparation time and cycle time. Time necessary to complete initial prep-
aration and each iteration previewed by the tool. Qualitative methods tend to 
have shorter preparation times while quantitative methods tend to have longer 
times. Because they are more qualitative, NIST 800-30 and OCTAVE likely 
have shorter preparation times. Of the methods reviewed, COBIT 5 has the 
longest preparation time due to the degree of customization required. NIST 800-
30, OCTAVE, and MAGERIT have mid-range preparation times. OCTAVE is 
considered to be possessing a medium-long cycle time. FAIR has a shorter cy-
cle time once you get through the somewhat longer preparation time. This is 
due to the use of automated tools. The questionnaire-based methods require 
only one iteration, generally; while methods with some sort of tool present are 
more iterative. High impact and high residual risks are almost always going to 
require additional, more in-depth analysis (Macedo & Silva, 2009). 
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II. Custom Weighs and Selection 
All the features listed in previous chapter received the attributed weigh. “Table I” 
illustrates custom weight distribution in regard to features evaluated.  Their Weigh 
correspond to priority chosen to fulfill specific requirements of SHOP&GO risk 
assessment.  
Table I 
Feature Scale explanation Custom Weight 
Framework/ Method Framework(1) or Method(5) like 0,1 
Quantitative/ Qualitative Mostly Quantitative(1) or Qualitative (5) 0,25 
Support tools available Poor and expensive (1) or full and free (5) 0,25 
Special Skills required No special skills (1) or highly skill dependent (5) -0,2 
Preparation Time Less time (1) or more time (5) needed -0,15 
Cycle Time Less time (1) or more time (5) needed -0,05 
1-Custom Weigh Factors 
 
The most relevant features like method being qualitative, with enough support 
material and without much special skills required were reflected in this way. Fea-
tures like Special Skills, Preparation and Cycle time got negative weights given 
the inverse influence of such on the final mark.  
The comparison “Table II” was constructed to compare the frameworks. Feature 
values were filled in using analyzed works in Chapter 3 as one source and indi-
vidual support documentation of frameworks as the other.  
Additional cultural fit feature was left aside from the main evaluation, so it can 
be considered in case of a draw. OCTAVE is reported to fit well with an engi-
neering and analytical mindset, and FAIR fits well with analysts who are num-
bers-oriented. (Tomhave, 2014) 









































































































































































ISO 31000 1 0,1 4 1 3 0,75 4 -0,8 2 -0,3 2 -0,1 0,65 
ISACA COBIT 5 2 0,2 3 0,75 3 0,75 4 -0,8 1 
-
0,15 2 -0,1 0,65 
FAIR 4 0,4 2 0,5 3 0,75 3 -0,6 4 -0,6 4 -0,2 0,25 
MAGERIT 3 0,3 4 1 2 0,5 3 -0,6 4 -0,6 4 -0,2 0,4 





OCTAVE Allegro 4 0,4 4 1 4 1 2 -0,4 4 -0,6 3 
-
0,15 1,25 
                           
Custom Weight Factor   0,1   0,25   0,25   -0,2   
-
0,15   
-
0,05   
2 - Framework Comparison 
 
OCTAVE Allegro scored the highest rank in the evaluation. This method is well 
documented and forgiving for less experienced professionals. It has relatively 
short preparation time, while being very agile in its cycle times (Carali et al, 
2007).  
Additional exclusion criteria was the ability of a method to give immediate re-
sults, by applying granulated approach. Most organizations do not have a one-
size-fits-all risk assessment, given that risk management process is expensive 
to collect. The solution has to provide the assessment results to fulfill the imme-
diate need along the process as well as create useful data for the future. Such 
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two-tier approach consists of a baseline procedure for general risk assessment 
and identification (typically qualitative) with more sophisticated methods for 
deeper analyses of high impact risks that fall outside the baseline (typically 
quantitative). OCTAVE, compared to FAIR is better suited for such baseline ap-
plication, as being more quantitative and thus flexible in its application.  
Last, but not least factor in favor of OCTAVE method (reflected in “Support Doc-
umentation” feature) is its open standard and as such free access to support 
materials.  
It is important to notice once again that the difference in terms of how all of 
these methods function is not considered to be significant. All the methods tend 
to converge to international ISO 31000 standard, varying the way they are ap-
plied, but targeting the same objectives. 
 
III. Octave Allegro Framework 
 
The OCTAVE Allegro approach is designed to allow broad assessment of an or-
ganization’s operational risk environment with the goal of producing more robust 
results without the need for extensive risk assessment knowledge (Alberts & 
Dorofee, 2009). 
OCTAVE Allegro approach differs from previous OCTAVE methods by focusing 
primarily on information assets in the context of how they are used, where they 
are stored, transported, and processed, and how they are exposed to threats, 
vulnerabilities, and disruptions as a result. (Carali et al, 2007). 
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The work process is divided into 8 sub-processes, falling into 4 activity areas: 
establishing drivers, profiling assets containers, identifying threats and identify-
ing and mitigating risks. OCTAVE Risk management process cycle follows the 
next steps:  
Step 1 - Establish Risk Measurement Criteria 
Step 2 - Develop an Information Asset Profile 
Step 3 - Identify Information Asset Containers 
Step 4 - Identify Areas of Concern 
Step 5 - Identify Threat Scenarios 
Step 6 - Identify Risks 
Step 7 - Analyze Risks 
Step 8 - Select Mitigation Approach 
Application of each step is explained and illustrated in the following chapter.  
Analysis and Assessment 
 
The following subsections of this chapter will provide general guidance and ex-
planation over the assessment steps performed. Detailed calculations and result-
ing tables can be found in the Attachments section of this document. 
I. Step 1 - Establish Risk Measurement Criteria 
 
The first step in the OCTAVE Allegro process establishes the organizational 
drivers that will be used to evaluate the effects of a risk to an organization’s mis-
sion and business objectives. These drivers are reflected in a set of risk meas-
urement criteria that is created and captured as part of this initial step. Risk 
measurement criteria are a set of qualitative measures against which the effects 
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of a realized risk can be evaluated and form the foundation of an information as-
set risk assessment (Carali et al, 2007). 
In the scope of the current project, Impact Areas’ prioritization is conducted in 
the following way:  
 
Table III 
Allegro Worksheet 7 Impact Area Prioritization Worksheet 
Priority Impact Areas 
1 Reputation and Customer Confidence 
2 Safety and Health 
3 Fines and Legal Penalties 
4 Productivity 
5 Financial 
3 – Impact Area Prioritization 
 
As the current assessment is focused on Shop&Go solution itself and not or-
ganization as a whole, priorities like Reputation and Safety of the product are el-
evated in the first place. These are cultural qualities promoted internally by or-
ganization and valued as an important asset.  
There are 3 Impact Levels defined by Octave Allegro method – Low, Medium 
and High. This distribution is used to help the assessor(s) in aligning the impact 
estimation in different areas by linking it to fixed estimated loss. For example, 
“Low” Impact on Operational Cost in Financial Impact Area may correspond to 5 
or less percent of the increase in operating cost. Such mapping permits usage 
of the same model in different business areas and the delivery of comparable 
results. It is especially important when two or more people are involved into as-
sessment process, so by performing this step, we can guarantee that everyone 
“is on the same page” when it comes up to the result comparison. 
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Other areas like Safety and Health or Reputation are of pure quantitative na-
ture. Detailed Risk Measurement Criteria description can be found in Attach-
ment section: “Attachment I – Risk Measurement Criteria”.  
II. Step 2 - Develop an Information Asset Profile 
 
A profile is a representation of an information asset describing its unique features, 
qualities, characteristics, and value. The methodology’s profiling process ensures 
that an asset is clearly and consistently described, that there is an unambiguous 
definition of the asset’s boundaries and that the security requirements for the as-
set are adequately defined. (Carali et al, 2007). 
Information asset profiles mapped in this step are common to the organization as 
a whole, but they will be used in the universe of Shop&Go instance in a store 
only. Such strict definition of boundaries is necessary for the next step of Octave 
Allegro approach – container definition. Information asset as, for example, client 
data is used and stored in multiple systems/databases. Analyzing their exposure 
to risk while looking at every possible scenario will go far beyond the target of this 
project, which is – evaluating added risk by SHOP&GO.   
Five main (most critical) information assets are identified:  
a) Client and Employee Data  
This type of data is being of, probably, highest criticality to LIDL, given past 
data loss scandals. It is subject to Private Data regulations imposed by Euro-
pean Union - (EU) 2016/679 - (EU) 2016/680. It is used for billing and Human 
Resources related processes. Shop&Go product may use such data for iden-
tification of customers, their home address for billing purposes, social network 
account for easy log in etc.  
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b) Payment Data - PCI DSS compliant 
Data Retrieved by cashless payment processes. Used for accounting and 
controlling purposes, besides payment process itself. Any disclosure or com-
promise of this data may put in question the PCI DSS certification of LIDL 
Portugal and harm its reputation. 
PCI DSS certification is an ongoing topic for the group and a lot of effort is 
put into obtaining and maintaining this certification valid. Certain features of 
SHOP&GO project, as for example mobile payment, may subject compliance 
with PCI norms.  
c) Shop&Go Solution related data 
Data type related to Shop&Go solution itself. Being innovative in its nature 
and still in development, the disclosure of such data may lead to the exposure 
of known vulnerabilities. The competitors are another concern – statistics 
from sales and solution architecture are the main topics of interest. Such data 
will become less important in the long run, but as of the time of this assess-
ment – it remains being a critical asset.  
d) Item Related Data  
Data related to particular article sold by LIDL, as well as consolidated data of 
purchases and sales based on time series. It includes everything from man-
ufacturer or supplier contacts to price schedules, campaigns, stock etc. Dis-
closure of this data may lead to competitive advantage loss, in short or me-
dium term.  
e) External Undesirable Data 
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External Undesirable data is all content type considered illegal or of classified 
nature and intended to be kept away from LIDL systems. Although external 
of its nature, control of this information asset is as important as of any internal 
one. The difference is clear – while we want to keep 4 previous data types 
within the boundaries of our systems, this type of asset is only welcome on 
the other side of the virtual border.  
Every information asset is mapped with its respective process owner. In the next 
step, the security requirements of the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) 
triangle are defined for each asset. In case there are any specific security require-
ments they are indicated at this step as well. Using the previous example of client 
data, a specific requirement is the (EU) 2016/679 - (EU) 2016/680 private data 
regulations. The requirements are then described in terms of necessary availa-
bility time, key users, regulatory compliance etc.  
Last important action in this phase is the mapping of five assets with the most 
important security requirement type (CIA) which was defined as follows, accord-
ing to group’s priorities and culture:  
Confidentiality: a.) Client and Employee Data; e.) External Undesirable Data 
Integrity: b.) Payment Data; c.) Shop&Go Solution related data 
Availability: d.) Item Related Data 
These priorities are used in the last step of assessment – recommendations. 
Given all other relevant factors are the same, CIA criteria will be used to prioritize 
one recommendation over the other. The tables illustrating this step are located 
in the Attachment section: “Attachment III – Critical Information Asset Profile”. 
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III. Step 3 - Identify Information Asset Containers 
 
Containers describe the places where information assets are stored, transported, 
and processed. Information assets reside not only in containers within an organ-
ization’s boundaries but they also often reside in containers that are not under 
the direct control of the organization. Any risks to the containers in which the 
information asset lives are inherited by the information asset. (Carali et al, 2007) 
In the scope of current assessment, only the containers added or influenced by 
new solution are analyzed. In other words, all containers existent before 
SHOP&GO implementation were considered a baseline (e.g. a POS terminal was 
installed long before the current project, therefore its risk exposure is out of 
scope; however, identified vulnerabilities and threats added by SHOP&GO de-
ployment and relevant to POS device will include this container in assessment 
process).  
According to solution diagram (can be found in Attachments section:  Attachment 
I – SHOP&GO Network Diagram), the following containers were identified:  
 3rd party Rack - Composed of Router, Switch and Access Points provided 
by external partner to enable Guest Wireless Network.  
 Stiftung’s Proxy – Proxy server located in international HQ which allows 
access to GK Cloud platform 
 External VPN connection – connection to Proxy Server in HQ (Germany) 
through public network, via VPN (managed by PT S.A.).  
 Store Switch & Router – Switching and routing devices used for connec-
tions within store and WAN. A minimum of two devices is necessary to 
permit physical segregation of PCI compliant VPN connection.  
 Fortinet FW – A firewall device which permits the creation of DMZ for 
MPOS Server 
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 S&G Cloud – S&G Servers nested in Cloud 
 Mobile Attendant – WinCE application / Windows Mobile OS operated de-
vice used by store manager 
 MPOS Server – virtual POS server used for billing on SHOP&GO check-
outs 
 PinPad Terminal – Card Payment terminals provided by Ingenico / SIBS 
 Shop&Go App (Android / iOS) – application created for SHOP&GO solu-
tion and installed by clients on their devices 
 Store BO (Backoffice) Server – Server connected to the HQ VPN and store 
POS devices. Key element in daily communications and POS operational 
management.  
 Store POS device – device used by store employee for checkout pur-
poses.  
 Scale Device – scales introduced for self-checkout purposes and con-
nected to GK Cloud (backoffice management software) 
 Paytower Device – device used to enable client checking out, even in ab-
sence of store employee.  
Additionally, some external containers and people involved are identified at this 
step as well. Detailed definition is located in the Attachments section: “Attachment 
IV – Information Containers”. 
Container´s main role in assessment process is split in two parts. As first one, 
clear definition of containers helps significantly during the steps of Area of Con-
cern identification (p.5.4). Secondly, this definition is crucial in recommendations 
part, where particular measures are applied to one or more identified containers.  
IV. Step 4 - Identify Areas of Concern 
 
Areas of concern is a definition of possible conditions or situations that can 
threaten an organization’s information asset. These real-world scenarios may 
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represent threats and their corresponding undesirable outcomes. Areas of con-
cern may characterize a threat that is unique to an organization and its operat-
ing conditions. The purpose of this step is not to capture a complete list of all 
possible threat scenarios for an information asset; instead, the idea is to quickly 
capture those situations or conditions that come immediately to the minds of the 
analysis team. (Carali et al, 2007) 
During the assessment, a total of 43 areas of concern was identified for five in-
formation asset profiles. Nearly a half of which (20) are equally spread between 
Client and PCI DSS compliant data assets. These are the main areas of con-
cern for the organization in the light of upcoming EU regulations in May of 2018.  
Definition of these areas was done in regard to information containers and, as 
stated above, real world cases. Certain events in this list are proven to be plau-
sible by previous penetration tests, others are inspired by common vulnerability 
databases or latest security breaches within the industry. It is important to no-
tice, that the tool I found the most useful at this step is a common sense of the 
assessor – it is up to him to keep in mind the context of the information asset, 
its value, possible motives of actors. Historical data and involvement in organi-
zational culture are helpful as well. 
High number of areas of concern is explained by the decision of making the first 
iteration of the assessment as wide as possible. In the next iterations, upon les-
sons learned and business needs, a more detailed view can be achieved, by 
adding more threat scenarios (described in next step). Each area of concern is 
justified by at least one threat scenario. Detailed information about every area of 
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concern and linked threat scenario can be found in Attachments section: “At-
tachment V-x – Information Asset Risk Worksheet: xxx”, where “x” stands for 
one of 5 information asset profiles.  
V. Step 5 - Identify Threat Scenarios 
In Step 5, the areas of concern captured in the previous step are expanded into 
threat scenarios that further detail the properties of a threat. (Carali et al, 2007) 
For a better understanding of how Area of Concern is interconnected with Threat 
Scenario in Octave method the following example can be used:  
Information Asset “Client & Employee Data” is subject to one of the areas of con-
cern - “A1R1 - Client data is stolen by Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack type on 
customer Wi-Fi network. A threat scenario is in general terms, a detailed definition 
of “How and why is this possible”. In this case, an attacker will most probably 
position himself in between client-store access point communication by using a 
Rogue AP technique.  
This is a particular Threat Scenario identified. One area of concern can and most 
likely has more than one threat scenario. It is up to an assessor to decide until 
what detail level he wants to go; how granular the risk assessment should be. In 
case of this project, the main focus was on the identification of as many areas of 
concern, as possible with at least one threat scenario to justify the feasibility of 
concern.  
For continuous improvement of general threat picture, additional iterations of risk 
assessment are necessary. In this particular case, I find that second iteration in 
combination with external audit / pen-test will be beneficial to get a more detailed 
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picture of possible threats or confirm the plausibility of identified ones. Unfortu-
nately, it was not possible to elaborate these steps at the moment of writing due 
to time and resources limitation.  
VI. Step 6 - Identify Risks 
In Step 5 threats are identified, and in Step 6 the consequences to an organiza-
tion if a threat is realized are captured, completing the risk picture. A threat can 
have multiple potential impacts on an organization. The activities involved in this 
step ensure that the various consequences of risk are captured. (Carali et al, 
2007) 
After completing this step, it was possible to define a Risk Score (a quantitative 
representation of impact in Octave Allegro) for every one of 43 identified threat 
scenarios. These risk scores are based on most probable threat scenario, as de-
scribed in previous chapter. As an assessor, I cannot guarantee inexistence of 
other threats in particular area of concern. As instead, I am focusing on the most 
probable scenario for every area to establish a comparable baseline of risk expo-
sure between them (areas of concern). This approach will create a heat map of 
major risk areas within the solution. 
Allegro method distributes likelihood of an event in three categories – Low, Me-
dium and High. The risk of particular threat scenario is identified by “gut feeling” 
of the assessor, what can be seen as a sum product of historical data available, 
common sense, trends in the industry and IS area (like major growing wave of 
ransomware attacks), latest vulnerabilities or technical difficulty of the attack. Fi-
nally yet importantly is a motivation – the value (monetary or not) an attack will 
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generate for the attacker. Not all these factors are taken in consideration (at 
least not in the direct way) by the Allegro method, therefore I find this step ex-
tremely dependent on the assessor experience and objective view. Given that 
the results of it are one of the major ingredients in final risk matrix, it should be 
performed with all necessary diligence. From 43 threat scenarios, 15 (or 
34,88%) were attributed “High” probability of occurrence in course of assess-
ment. Certain scenarios were proven plausible by successful simulations in 
course of internal audits and penetration tests.  
VII. Step 7 - Analyze Risks 
In Step 7 of this assessment, a simple quantitative measure of the extent to which 
the organization is impacted by a threat is computed. This relative risk score is 
derived by considering the extent to which the consequence of a risk impacts the 
organization against the relative importance of the various impact areas, and pos-
sibly the probability. (Carali et al, 2007) 
As in the previous step, it is up to the assessor to identify the severity of impact 
in every area identified in the first step of the assessment. However, upon com-
pletion of this project, I find it better bounded and audit-ready compared to prob-
ability definition. First, because the framework defines in a first step the monetary 
boundaries of an impact being Low, Medium or High in different areas – Financial, 
Reputational etc. This serves as a reminder for an assessor and helps to be ob-
jective in different assessment areas. Secondly, every impact decision has to be 
justified in short text. Such simple mechanism permits easy validation by another 
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person involved in process, as it justifies the decision; and indirectly makes an 
assessor question his decisions along the process and evaluate the impact again.  
Both probabilities and risks scores can be found in the same section of Attach-
ments: “Attachment V-x – Information Asset Risk Worksheet: xxx”, where “x” 
stands for one of 5 information asset profiles. 
 
Table IV 
Relative Risk Matrix 
  Risk Score 
Probability 30-45 16-29 0-15 
High Mitigate Mitigate/Defer Mitigate/Defer 
Medium Mitigate/Defer Mitigate/Defer Defer/Accept 
Low Defer/Accept Defer/Accept Accept 
4 – Relative Risk Matrix 
After the impact definition is performed, score values are obtained for every one 
of 43 threat scenarios. These values may range from 0 to 45 in Allegro Relative 
Risk Matrix. This particular assessment has resulted in values from 20 (minimum) 
to 36 (maximum). An average Risk Score of 43 Threat Scenarios is 27. Depend-
ing on the probability/risk score combination an action approach is suggested – 
either Mitigate, Defer or Accept the risk.  
VIII. Step 8 - Select Mitigation Approach 
In Step 8, the final step of the OCTAVE Allegro process, organizations determine 
which of the risks they have identified require mitigation and develop a mitigation 
strategy for those risks. This is accomplished by first prioritizing risks based on 
their relative risk score. Once risks have been prioritized, mitigation strategies are 
developed that consider the value of the asset and its security requirements, the 
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containers in which it lives, and the organization’s unique operating environment. 
(Carali et al, 2007) 
In case of mitigation recommendation, the corrective measure is applied to the 
impact, rather than to a probability of occurrence. All identified high-risk scenarios 
are matched in this step with a corrective (mitigation) measure, what doesn’t 
mean that a risk evasion approach cannot be taken later on. For example, in case 
of too high mitigation costs certain system features or components may be re-
considered or completely dropped. Same applies to risk acceptance strategy. 
Current evaluation is limited to identifying highest impact vs probability combina-
tion and provisioning of contra-measures (with estimated effort of implementa-
tion).  
All risk scenarios identified in the previous steps were collected on a single table. 
It can be found in the Attachment section: “Attachment VI – Threat Scenarios and 
Mitigation”. The table illustrates an area of concern, with its risk score (impact); if 
the impact of this scenario is challenging the most important security requirement 
for this information asset (CIA Priority); estimated probability; suggested action 
and mitigation measures, if applicable.  
For visualization purpose, a risk matrix is constructed with “Mitigate” and “Miti-
gate/Defer” quadrants highlighted by different color areas. It is illustrated in Figure 
I – Risk Heat Map: 




5- Risk Heat Map 
There are 7 cases subject to mitigation recommendations, these are, threat sce-
narios with highest probability and risk score combination. All cases located in 
“Mitigate / Defer” quadrants are subject to further analysis by the assessor – 
whether these should be included or not in the mitigation plans. As stated in chap-
ter 5.2 – Most Important Security Requirement (CIA) of every asset profile is used 
to prioritize some of the threat scenarios over the others. So, for example, two 
threat scenarios with equal risk score and probability in PCI DSS compliant data 
asset were treated differently, depending on their Threat Outcome. For this asset 
profile Integrity was defined as the most important requirement, therefore threat 
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In this way, in addition to 7 Mitigation cases selected, cases from Mitigate / Defer 
pool were picked as well. Table V illustrates the final list of Threat Scenarios con-
sidered to be mission critical and subject to mitigation strategy. They are sorted 
from most critical to less critical (based on risk score and probability) – from top 
to bottom.  
Table V 
Threat Scenario Mitigation Measure 
A1R3 - Client Data stolen by breaching store LAN MS11 MS10 MS13 MS14 
A3R1 - Insecure Protocols in MBWay Implementation MS01 MS02     
A1R4 - Client Data stolen by DB Crack MS07 MS09 MS08   
A3R2 - Insecure Protocols in MBWay Implementation MS01 MS02     
A5R1 - Unintended Guest Network Usage MS17       
A5R4 - Illegal / Restricted information stored MS15 MS16     
A1R8 - Client data sniffed in between APP & Server Communication MS01 MS10 MS09   
A2R3- Payment Data Availability MS11 MS10 MS13 MS14 
A1R5 - Employee data breach by BO access MS05       
A3R6 - Application code revealed MS04 MS10 MS01   
A4R6 - Application functionality modified MS04 MS10 MS01   
A1R6 - Employee and Client data leaked MS14       
A1R1 - Client data is stolen by MitM attack type MS12 MS10     
A4R4 - Delete data on exposed devices MS09       
A3R7 - S&G configuration data destroyed MS16 MS15     
A5R2 - Backup / Configuration files MS03 MS15 MS16   
6 – Threat Scenarios recommended for prioritized mitigation 
As the last part of Octave Method, the mitigation measures were defined for the 
complete list of Threat Scenarios, with exception of ones Octave Methodology 
defines as acceptable (low probability, low risk score quadrant). These measures 
are linked to the containers defined in Chapter 5.3. Complete Mitigation Measures 
Matrix can be found in Attachments section: Attachment VI – Threat Scenarios 
and Mitigation Measures. A more detailed discussion of measures and limitations 
of Octave Allegro approach at this final step will follow in the next chapter.  
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Recommendations for risk management 
 
Octave approach does not provide any tool or method for prioritizing one mitiga-
tion plan over the other, except Risk Score / Probability combination. It does not 
take into account the cost of mitigation measures, another important aspect of 
risk management discipline. Application of Allegro method ends on linking spe-
cific mitigation plan to each identified Threat Scenario, as shown in the previous 
chapter.  
To address this problem, a simple priority-based framework is used to provide an 
alternative solution when it comes up to risk management exercise. It consists of 
two steps: first, defining so called Implementation Effort, a value on a scale from 
0 to 10 representing resource usage to implement a measure; secondly, the big-
gest part of measures does not contribute to one and only Threat Scenario, so 
the number of scenarios affected by the measure is also accounted. Certainly, 
such effort estimation is based on a pure experience of an assessor and is one 
of the points discussed in the Limitations chapter – the estimation process may 
be improved in future. Attributed effort value and a number of covered threat sce-
narios for every measure can be found in Attachments section: Attachment VII – 
Measures and Containers. The main idea behind this approach is an attempt to 
guarantee as secure state as possible, while dealing with limited resources 
(budget restrictions). It doesn´t mean, however, that other measures are irrele-
vant or less important, as the secure state of any system is equal to its weakest 
point. The objective is to provide a top-pick of measures by their impact, which 
can be used as an indicator when decisions have to be taken on what system, 
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policy or control to focus. A graphical representation of this distribution is illus-
trated below.  
Figure 2 
7 – Mitigation measure by Implementation Effort / TS Coverage 
By visualizing the impact of each measure on the identified threat scenarios, it 
becomes evident that some measures are transversal to the big part of scenarios. 
If these, at the same time, do not require significant implementation effort, they 
should be considered by management as a priority for mitigation measures. 
Such presentation of findings gives an easier way to transmit the message to 
stakeholders, even if the area of their expertise do not include IS. It is flexible and 
ready for additional measure, containers and threat scenarios input. So the find-
ings of further iterations of Octave Allegro method will be included.  


















Covered TS Implementation Effort
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This iteration of risk assessment has identified threat scenarios which can be 
covered by 17 major measures. The top 5 measures by TS coverage are detailed 
below:  
MS10 – “Configure and use encrypted protocols whenever possible. If encryption 
protocols are not available for some applications, evaluate the possibility of VPN 
usage” 
It is explained by historical limitations and negligence. Many rudimentary systems 
within a store are running insecure versions of communication protocols. A num-
ber of audits have illustrated this fact. Scan, detect and update to secure versions 
when possible. Accept the risk when usage of the unsecured protocol is due to a 
system limitation. Document exceptions.  
MS09 – “Change all default passwords. Use password management software. 
Enforce the usage of strong passwords across all company” 
A number of devices operated with default login/password combination. Data-
bases using SYS/ADM accounts with default passwords. Given the pilot stage of 
the project with its constant changes, configuration and new deployments – it is 
recommended to pay special attention to password management. Create proce-
dures and cover this topic in awareness programs for involved employees.  
MS01 – “Use TLS, all pages must be served over HTTPS, The HTTP Strict 
Transport Security Header must be used, Cookies must be marked as Secure” 
This measure is applied on the SHOP&GO app, which is using HTTP with clear 
text XML files to communicate with the server, among other severe security flaws. 
This permits all kinds of data manipulation and eavesdropping. This container 
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works with a number of sensitive data types – personal information, payment 
data. Run pen-test with independent partners to proof communication security. 
MS11 – “Design and create access policies based on business needs and en-
force it using firewalls or native filtering capabilities of network devices” 
A revision of access policies is recommended for the SHOP&GO-ready stores 
before the rollout. Periodic audits are recommended as well. Usage of protocol 
and network mapping tools is advised for complete assessment.  
MS02 – “Use OWASP Top10 check / Guarantee AppSecurity through PenTest”.  
Another measure to address the problems of systems exposed to clients. Before 
it comes to a full-scale rollout a common vulnerabilities pen-testing should be 
performed on every exposed system (Black Box method). Detected vulnerabili-
ties should be fixed.  
Other measures identified in course of this assessment are listed below: 
 MS03 - Use SIEM solution to detect intrusion / Use honeypots 
 MS04 - Application’s code should be obfuscated, for example, with the 
ProGuard tool. 
 MS05 - Store all GDPR compliant data encrypted 
 MS06 - Reinforce store infrastructure (add switching / routing devices) 
 MS07 - Implement Database Hardening; When possible, disable default 
SYS-like accounts;  
 MS08 - Inventory of applications, versions & owners. Implement or adjust 
a regular mechanism for installation of security updates. 
 MS12 - Implement a Wireless Intrusion Prevention System 
 MS13 - Implement Physical Security Monitoring 
 MS14 - Use centralized DB console for access control (e.g. Cloud Control) 
 MS15 - Use Log-indexing system for version / patching checks 
 MS16 - Define and implement internal awareness programs by functional 
area 
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 Implement traffic filter / DNS blacklist 
Conclusions 
The main contribution of this project is an overview it provides on a secure state 
of Shop&Go solution. It is different in its nature from a traditional pen-testing ap-
proach used by organizations, whose main focus on is the identification of vul-
nerabilities. This study was based and performed around information assets and 
their value for the organization at one side, and the known and expected vulner-
abilities with respective fixes (and estimated effort to implement the fix) at the 
other. By uniting all possible concerns and estimations in one report, a decision 
making task becomes easier when it comes up to measure implementation with 
limited resources.  
To address all these problems, an initial study of existing risk assessment frame-
works was performed. I have picked Octave Allegro method as the one being the 
best fit-for-purpose solution for this project. Along the assessment process, I have 
taken some conclusions about the method itself, its strong points and limitations.  
The main findings of risks are related to publicly exposed assets and their ser-
vices. As one of the first experiences of providing to the end customer an access 
to internal infrastructure, a number of checks need to be run to secure store read-
iness. Therefore, a formal procedure is suggested for new implementations, as 
well as periodic checks of the existing ones (by automated audit tools, for exam-
ple). Main topics for improvements are secure communication, improvements in 
physical security policy, password and patch management revision and aware-
ness of the store personnel / IT personnel.  
S.Shapovalov Self-Scanning Solution in Retail: Risk Assessment 36 
36 
 
The list of suggested measures can be used as a reference by the organizations 
within the industry, which are planning any similar type of deployment. As this 
was the first risk assessment iteration performed, its results are sufficiently ge-
neric and applicable to other sites and projects. 
Discussion and limitations 
In course of this project, only the initial iteration of Octave Allegro method was 
performed. I find it beneficial to run the second iteration with the involvement of 
key users from main areas of concern – e.g. Networking, Database Administra-
tion. This step was not performed due to limitations of time and resources (such 
key users are responsible for running business-as-usual and IS normally stays in 
the last place in their agenda).  
Given that SHOP&GO project is run as a proof of concept, resources available 
for its fixes are limited and hardly accessible. For this reason, many measures 
suggested in this study may only be applicable in case of project approval and 
full-scale rollout.  
Octave Allegro framework has proven itself efficient and complete with exception 
of some particular points. I found it extremely dependent on assessor’s experi-
ence and common sense when it came up to probability definition. Secondly, I 
think it may be improved in the very last stage of measure recommendations to 
include some sort of ranking mechanism for the suggested measures.  
To permit such ranking, a simple method of measure distribution was introduced, 
as described in chapter 6. Its main limitation is the attributed value of estimated 
effort to implement one measure. This calculation in future assessments may be 
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based on a real monetary value provided by implementing partner, for example. 
It is important to notice that improvement of this ranking mechanism may change 
the priority distribution of different measures, but not the validity of measure itself.  
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a networking hardware device that allows a Wi-Fi device to connect to a wired network. 
DNS 
Blacklist 
a "blacklist" of locations on the Internet reputed to be harmful or undesireble within com-
pany network 
Firewall a technological barrier designed to prevent unauthorized or unwanted communications 
between computer networks or hosts 
GDPR a regulation in EU law on data protection and privacy for all individuals within the European 
Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA). 
Hardening 
(IT) 
the process of securing a system by reducing its surface of vulnerability, which is larger 
when a system performs more functions 
Honeypot 
(IS) 
a computer security mechanism set to detect, deflect, or, in some manner, counteract at-





sometimes shortened to InfoSec, is the practice of preventing unauthorized access, use, 








a part of Vulnerability management - the cyclical practice of identifying, classifying, reme-
diating, and mitigating vulnerabilities by application of most recent system updates 
PCI DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard is an information security standard for or-
ganizations that handle branded credit cards from the major card schemes. 
Pen Test A penetration test, colloquially known as a pen test, is an authorized simulated attack on a 
computer system, performed to evaluate the security of the system. 
POS The point of sale (POS) is the time and place where a retail transaction is completed. 
Proxy Ser-
ver 
a server (a computer system or an application) that acts as an intermediary for requests 




the determination of quantitative or qualitative estimate of risk related to a well-defined si-
tuation and a recognized threat 
Risk Score a quantified impact rating of risk scenario suggested by Octave Allegro method 
Router a networking device that forwards data packets between computer networks. 
Shop&Go internal name of a self-scanning and self-checkout product developed by Lidl Gmbh. 
SIEM security information and event management provide real-time analysis of security alerts 
generated by applications and network hardware 
Switch computer networking device that connects devices together on a computer network by u-
sing packet switchingto receive, process, and forward data to the destination device 
VPN a private network extended across a public network, to enable users to send and receive 
data as if their computing devices were directly connected to the private network 
WAN wide area network is a telecommunications network or computer network that extends over 
a large geographical distance/place. 
WIPS a wireless intrusion prevention system is a network device that monitors the radio spect-
rum for the presence of unauthorized access points and take countermeasures 
 




Attachment I – SHOP&GO Network Dia-
gram 
S&G Cloud 
   
 
Allegro Worksheet 1 Risk Measurement Criteria – Reputation and Customer Confidence 
Impact Area Low Moderate High 
Reputation (Company) 
Reputation of LIDL is minimally affected; little or no effort 
or expense is required to recover. 
Reputation is damaged, and some effort and expense is required 
to recover. 
Reputation is irrevocably destroyed or damaged. 
Reputation (Shop&Go) 
Reputation of Shop&Go is minimally affected; little or no ef-
fort or expense is required to recover. 
Reputation is damaged, and some effort and expense is required 
to recover. 
Reputation is irrevocably destroyed or damaged. 
Customer Loss (Company) 
Less than 3% reduction in customers due to loss of confi-
dence 
3 to 10 % reduction in customers due to loss of confidence 
More than 10 % reduction in customers due to loss of confi-
dence 
Users Loss (Shop&Go) 
Less than 2% reduction in customers due to loss of confi-
dence 
2 to 15 % reduction in customers due to loss of confidence 15 to 30 % reduction in customers due to loss of confidence 
    
Allegro Worksheet 2 Risk Measurement Criteria – Financial  
Impact Area Low Moderate High 
Operating Costs 
Increase of less than 5% in yearly operating costs of 
Shop&Go Solution 
Yearly operating costs increase by 5 to 10 %. Yearly operating costs increase by more than 10%. 
Revenue Loss Less than 5% yearly revenue of Shop&Go Solution loss 5 to 10% yearly revenue loss Greater than 10% yearly revenue loss 
One-Time Financial Loss One-time financial cost of less than €10,000 One-time financial cost of €10,000 to €25,000 One-time financial cost greater than €25,000 
    
Allegro Worksheet 3 Risk Measurement Criteria – Productivity  
Impact Area Low Moderate High 
Staff Hours - affected locations 
Staff work hours are increased by less than 5 % for 1 to 14 
day(s). 
Staff work hours are increased between 5 % and 10 % for 1 
to14 day(s). 
Staff work hours are increased by greater than 10% for more 
than 14 days. 
Staff Hours - IT 
Staff work hours are increased by less than 5 % for 1 to 7 
day(s). 
Staff work hours are increased between 5 % and 15 % for 1 to 7 
day(s). 
Staff work hours are increased by greater than 15% for more 
than 7 days. 
Staff Hours - External Partners Extra work hours required of less than 5 % for 1 to 7 day(s). Extra work hours required of 5 to 10 % for 1 to 7 day(s). Extra work hours required of >10% for more than 7 day. 
    
Allegro Worksheet 4 Risk Measurement Criteria – Safety and Health  
Impact Area Low Moderate High 
Life 
No loss or significant threat to customers’ or staff members’ 
lives 
Customers’ or staff members’ lives are threatened, but they will 
recover after receiving medical treatment. 
Loss of customers’ or staff members’ lives 
Health 
Minimal, immediately treatable degradation in customers’ or 
staff members’ health with recovery within four days 
Temporary or recoverable impairment of customers’ or staff 
members’ health 
Permanent impairment of significant aspects of customers’ 
or staff members’ health 
Safety Safety questioned Safety affected Safety violated 
    
Allegro Worksheet 5 Risk Measurement Criteria – Fines and Legal Penalties 
Impact Area Low Moderate High 
Fines Fines less than €5,000 are levied. Fines between €5,000 and €50,000 are levied. Fines greater than €50,000 are levied. 
Lawsuits 
Non-frivolous lawsuit or lawsuits less than € 50,000 are filed 
against the organization, or frivolous lawsuit(s) are filed 
against the organization. 
Non-frivolous lawsuit or lawsuits between €50,000 and 
€500,000 are filed against the organization. 
Non-frivolous lawsuit or lawsuits greater than €500,000 are 
filed against the organization. 
Investigations 
No queries from government or other investigative organiza-
tions 
Government or other investigative organization requests infor-
mation or records (low profile). 
Government or other investigative organization initiates a 
high-profile, in-depth investigation into organizational prac-
tices. 
Attachment   II – Risk Measurement Criteria
   
 
Allegro Worksheet 8 Critical Information Asset Profile         
(1) Critical Asset 
What is the critical information as-
set? 
Client and Employee Data - Private 
(Personal) Data 
Payment Data - PCI DSS 
compliant 
Shop&Go Solution re-
lated data.  
Item Related Data (Purchase - 
Sale) 
External Undesirable Data 
(2) Rationale for Selection 
Why is this information asset im-
portant to the organization? 
Client Data is valuable not only for cor-
rect billing purposes, but for marketing 
and other reporting activities. Disclo-
sure of such data had long going conse-
quences for LIDL group in the past, 
therefore, this information asset is 
treated with as much attention as possi-
ble. Employee data is subject to the 
same regulations, being private in its 
type. 
Data Retrieved by cash-
less payment processes. 
Used for accounting and 
controlling purposes. 
Any disclosure or com-
promise of this date may 
put in question the PCI 
DSS certification of 
LIDL Portugal and harm 
its reputation. 
Data type related to 
Shop&Go solution it-
self. Being innovative 
in its nature and still in 
development, disclo-
sure of such data may 
lead to further vulnera-
bilities exposure.  
Data related to particular article 
sold by LIDL. Everything from 
its manufacturer or supplier, 
price programming, campaigns, 
stock etc. Disclosure of this data 
may lead to competitive loss. 
External Undesirable data is all con-
tent type considered illegal or of 
classified nature and intended to be 
kept away from LIDL systems. Alt-
hough external of its nature, control 
of this information asset is as im-
portant as of any internal one.  
(3) Description 
What is the agreed-upon description 
of this information asset? 
This Data information type consists of 
all the registries linkable to individual 
client or employee of organization, 
such as VAT number, contact infor-
mation, salary etc. Private Data is eve-
rything falling under Personal Data cat-
egory in terms of upcoming Data Pro-
tection regulations (EU2018) 
Data falling under PCI 
DSS classification. Data 
regarding realized trans-
actions is supposed to be 
stored for 5 years by le-
gal norms. It is subject to 
internal and external 
(government) audits.  
Data related to the pro-
ject. Everything from 
IP addresses and ports, 
protocol types, access 
credentials and pass-
words used by solution 
to high level strategy 
plans and statistical re-
ports. 
Critical data from individual 
items sold in stores, which has 
value to competition. It is used 
by many modules of ERP sys-
tem. It is required for correct 
functioning of stores in the first 
place and all support depart-
ments like Purchase or Retail.  
All data not intended to be stored on 
LIDLs systems, as for example ille-
gal content downloaded by employ-
ees or users of open networks pro-
vided by LIDL. 
(4) Owner(s) Who owns this information asset? Data Protection Officer (DPO), HR HQ ISO ISO 
Sales Dpt. (VK), Purchase dpt. 
(EK) 
unidentified 
(5) Security Requirements           
What are the security requirements for this information asset?           
  Confidentiality
Only authorized personnel can view 
this information asset, as follows:  
Store Personnel with access rights to 
Clients data. Store manager with lim-
ited access rights to employee data.  
Store employee on the 
moment of transaction, 
"read" rights of particu-
lar transaction.  
IT personell Store Personell and Manager 
Nobody is intended to have access 
to this information.  
  Integrity
Only authorized personnel can mod-
ify this information asset, as follows: 
Store employee, only regarding varia-
ble client data: Name, VAT number, 
address.  
Information should not 
be modified. 
IT personell 
Only Sales Manager can modify 
certain fields of this infor-
mation.  
Any LIDL employee may modify 
this information.  
  Availability
This asset must be available for these 
personnel to do their jobs, as follows: 
Store personnel for billing purposes, 
Store manager for planning purposes 
(HR data).  
Information should be 
available until  
IT Personell Store Personell 
Nobody is intended to have access 
to this information.  
This asset must be available for: 
20h, 7 days a week, 52 weeks a year. 
Client/HR Data may not be available in 
a short window of 4 hours a day for 
system's maintenance purposes. 
20h, 7d/w, 52w/y. 24h/d, 5d/w,52w/d 20h, 7d/w, 52w/y. 0h, 0d/w, 0w/y 
  Other
This asset has special regulatory 
compliance protection requirements, 
as follows: 
It must respect EU Data Protection and 
Private Data Regulations  (EU) 
2016/679 - (EU) 2016/680 
PCI DSS regulation 
General Information 
Security Practices 
- Civil and Criminal Law regulation 
(6) Most Important Security Requirement Confidentiality Integrity Integrity Availability Confidentiality 
What is the most important security requirement for this information as-
set? 
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Allegro Worksheet 9a Allegro Worksheet 9a Allegro Worksheet 9a Allegro Worksheet 9a Allegro Worksheet 9a



































































Owner(s) Owner(s) Owner(s) Owner(s) Owner(s)
Frederix Gmbh UNICRE S.A.
PT S.A., third 
party provider
PT S.A., third 
party provider
PT S.A., third 
party provider
Lidl INT Lidl INT GK Software GK Software
GK Software GK Software PT S.A.
Allegro Worksheet 9b Allegro Worksheet 9b Allegro Worksheet 9b Allegro Worksheet 9b Allegro Worksheet 9b




Store Manager Store Staff
Store Manager
Owner(s) Owner(s) Owner(s) Owner(s) Owner(s)
- - Third Party -
Third Party 
Partners
Allegro Worksheet 9c Allegro Worksheet 9c Allegro Worksheet 9c Allegro Worksheet 9c Allegro Worksheet 9c
Department or Unit Department or Unit Department or Unit Department or Unit Department or Unit
Store Instance Store Instance Store Instance Store Instance Store Instance
Regional Center HQ HQ Regional Center Store Instance
HQ HQ HQ HQ
HQ Regional Center Regional Center
Department or Unit Department or Unit Department or Unit Department or Unit Department or Unit
External Partner Third Party Third Party Third Party
Information Asset Risk Environment Map 
Store Switch & Router
Mobile Attendant
S&G Cloud







Store BO (Backoffice) Server
Shop&Go App (Android / iOS)
Client and Employee Data - Private (Personal) Data
1. Store Employee
2. IT Employee












Name or Role / Responsibility
1. Store Employee
Information Asset Risk Environment Map (People)
Internal Personnel











Store Switch & Router
Fortinet FW
Shop&Go App (Android / iOS)
PinPad Terminal
Information Asset Risk Environment Map 
Internal
Container Description
Store Switch & Router
Mobile Attendant
Store BO (Backoffice) Server
Scale Device
External VPN connection
Information Asset Risk Environment Map 
Name or Role / Responsibility








Information Asset Risk Environment Map (People)
Internal Personnel





Information Asset Risk Environment Map (People)
Internal Personnel
Name or Role / Responsibility
Internal
Container Description
Store Switch & Router
POS device
Store BO (Backoffice) Server
Scale Device







1. Internal manuals and guidelines
3rd party Rack
S&G Cloud
Information Asset Risk Environment Map 
MPOS Server




Information Asset Risk Environment Map 
MPOS Server








Name or Role / Responsibility
Information Asset Risk Environment Map (People)
Internal Personnel



















































Name or Role / Responsibility




1. Undesired information prints
Internal
Container Description
1. Undesired information prints
3rd party Rack
External VPN connection
Information Asset Risk Environment Map 
Stiftungs Proxy Stiftungs Proxy S&G Cloud S&G Cloud
Client and Employee Data - Private (Personal) Data Payment Data - PCI DSS compliant Shop&Go Solution related data. Item Related Data (Purchase - Sale) External Undesirable Data
PinPad Terminal










Store Switch & Router
Stiftungs Proxy


























Dis Dis Dis Dis Dis
Med Low Hig Hig Med
























































Productivity Low 2 Productivity Low 2 Productivity Low 2 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6
Financial Low 1 Financial Low 1 Financial Low 1 Financial High 3 Financial High 3
26 31 31 29 29
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Hig Med Hig Low Low
























































Productivity Low 2 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6 Productivity Medium 4 Productivity High 6
Financial Medium 2 Financial Medium 2 Financial Medium 2 Financial Medium 2 Financial High 3
26 30 28 22 31
No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 
lead to loss of reputation for the whole group. 
A1R6 - Employee and Client data leaked
(1) Actor External/Internal Attacker
(2) Means
After inrusion to network it is possible to 
manipulate S&G scales due to unsecure BO app
(6) Probability




A1R8 - Client data sniffed in between APP & Server Communication






(7) Consequences (8) Severity
(6) Probability
No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
Disclosure
Medium
No big impact is expected
Disclosure














Client / Employee Personal Data
(1) Actor External Attacker
(2) Means
Create a fake WiFi acess point and sniff the client 
data being transferred
(3) Motive Get access to sensitive personal data
(5) Security Requirements GDPR compliance
(4) Outcome
Reduction of turnover is possible due to reputational loss
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
A1R1 - Client data is stolen by MitM attack type
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. Given that breach occur on 









A1R2 - Client data stolen by LWL-M WLAN crack
(1) Actor External Attacker
(2) Means
Gain access to LWL-M WLAN by using common 
password
(3) Motive
Get access to secure store network, used for 
communication between devices; access 
















No big impact is expected
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
Large chunks of client data can be obtained after 
successful breach of store LAN. Data may become 
unavailable (low impact on one store only) or 
disclosed (big impact - fines and reputation loss)
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 
lead to heavy fines and loss of reputation for the whole 
group. 
No big impact is expected
After successful breach an attacker will most likely 
















A1R3 - Client Data stolen by breaching store LAN
(1) Actor External/Internal Attacker 
(2) Means
Gain access to LAN by using scale's TP 
connection (and spoofing its MAC 
address)
(3) Motive
Get access to secure store network, 
used for communication between 
devices; access files/databases stored 
on devices
(4) Outcome
(5) Security Requirements GDPR compliance





Obtain data stored in internal 
databases
(4) Outcome




After successful breach an attacker will most likely 
drop the database to harden the audit
(8) Severity
Disclosure will lead to reputation loss. 
Disclosure most probably will originate moderate 
fines. 

















A1R5 - Employee data breach by BO access
(1) Actor External Attacker
(2) Means
After successful breach get access to 
store Back Office server due to 
unsecure protocols
(3) Motive
Access to employee information, 
administrative accounts and 
passwords
(4) Outcome
(5) Security Requirements Lidl internal Access Control Policies
(6) Probability




In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
Reputation loss of this kind most probably will turn significant number 
of clients away from the brand. 
Relative Risk Score
(7) Consequences(8) Severity
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 


















A1R4 - Client Data stolen by DB Crack
(1) Actor External/Internal Attacker
(2) Means
After successful breach get access to 
ERP DB by using common login/pwd 
combination
(2) Means
Modify Database entries due to shared 
accounts / permissive filtering with DBs 
access
(3) Motive
Information modification for own 
benefit
(4) Outcome


















Significant loss of reputation is expected in case of 
service unavailability
Relative Risk Score
Access to such data will permit attacker alter it and 
use to his own advantage, leading to losses
No big impact is expected
Certain data modification may compromise safety & 
health requirements
DDOS attack will disable S&G functionality and lead 
to unoperational state
(7) Consequences (8) Severity

















A1R9 - Employee Data Modification
(1) Actor Internal Employee
(6) Probability
No big impact is expected
Low
(3) Motive
Access to employee information, 




LIDL Information Security Policy; S&G 
SLA
Interruption
A1R10 - Client Information unavailable
(1) Actor External Attacker
(2) Means
Order or execute a DDoS attack on S&G 










Access to such data will permit attacker alter it and 
use to his own advantage, leading to losses
Destruction of data will turn impossible for certain type sales through 
S&G
Medium impact is expected on sales drop, as S&G share of total sales is 

















A1R7 - Client Data Destroyed
(1) Actor External Attacker
(2) Means
Ransomware injection through S&G 
infrastructure
(3) Motive
Blackmail / Intentionall will to harm the 
organization
(4) Outcome
















In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
(7) Consequences
No big impact is expected
Relative Risk Score




By usage of insecure HTTP protocol 
everyone with access to network can 
see in clear text the transactions
(3) Motive
Internal employee collecting critical 




Lidl Software Development 






Reduction of turnover is possible due to reputational loss
(6) Probability
(7) Consequences (8) Severity
(3) Motive Take pictures of employees or clients, espionage
(4) Outcome





















Dis Int Des Dis Dis
Med Hig Med Hig Med
























































Productivity Low 2 Productivity Medium 4 Productivity High 6 Productivity Medium 4 Productivity Low 2
Financial Low 1 Financial Medium 2 Financial Medium 2 Financial Medium 2 Financial Low 1
31 24 30 26 31











Int Dis Dis Dis Dis
Med Med Low Med Med
























































Productivity Medium 4 Productivity Medium 4 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6
Financial Low 1 Financial Medium 2 Financial Low 1 Financial Low 1 Financial Medium 2
22 31 27 27 36
After successful breach an attacker will most likely 
drop the database to harden the audit
Functionality  and security of all POS devices must be 
requalified
No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected
Medium productivity loss due to S&G service unavailability
(2) Means
Switching of PinPads in store to 
modified ones, which 



































































k (4) Outcome Interruption (4) Outcome Destruction (4) Outcome Disclosure















External Attacker / Internal 
Employee



































(1) Actor Internal Employee (1) Actor External Attacker
(2) Means
Highjack a priviledged user 
account / Use new store 
infrastructure for LAN access
(3) Motive
Low (6) Probability Medium
May generate fines by being responsible for delivery of unsecure APP
After successful breach an attacker will most likely 
drop the database to harden the audit
(1) Actor External Attacker
(2) Means
By sniffing insecure traffic between user 
device and Payment Terminal
(2) Means
By using dedicated PCI VLAN / Switch. 
Using it for other connections. 
(2) Means
Gain access to LAN by using 
scale's TP connection (and 
spoofing its MAC address), inject 
ransomware
(2) Means
After successful breach get 





A2R10 - Forwarding of card data from POS
(1) Actor
Internal / Third-Party employee with 
access to store LAN






















Use RAM Scraper to forward 
data to HTTP server
(3) Motive
User payment data collection, possible 
future fraud
(3) Motive Unawareness / Negligence (3) Motive
Blackmail / Intentionall will to 
harm the organization
(2) Means
Physically disconnecting network 
appliances to disrupt service
(2) Means
Fake QR codes for downloadable APP in 
store
(2) Means
Weak / Shared passwords. SNMP 





















A2R5 - PinPad physical substitution
(1) Actor




Obtain data stored in internal 
databases
(3) Motive Steal card data
(3) Motive Sabotage of S&G solution
Disclosure
(4) Outcome Disclosure
(4) Outcome Interruption (4) Outcome Disclosure
(3) Motive Steal of card data Steal card details in APP (3) Motive
Espionage / Blackmail on 
payment transactions
(3) Motive




PCI-DSS Compliance / Internal Policy
(5) Security 
Requirements
PCI-DSS Compliance / Internal 
Policy
(4) Outcome Disclosure (4) Outcome Disclosure (4) Outcome
(5) Security 
Requirements
PCI DSS; LIDL CP 3.3.2
(6) Probability Medium (6) Probability High (6) Probability Medium (6) Probability High
(5) Security 
Requirements
PCI DSS; LIDL CP 3.3.2
(5) Security 
Requirements
PCI DSS; LIDL CP 3.3.2
(5) Security 
Requirements
PCI DSS; LIDL CP 3.3.2
(5) Security 
Requirements











(6) Probability (6) Probability Medium
(6) Probability Medium
(6) Probability Medium (6) Probability Medium
(8) Severity(8) Severity(7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences
(7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity
(7) Consequences (8) Severity
(7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
Large chunks of client data can be obtained after 
successful breach of store LAN. By launching a locker 
application local data may become unavailable / 
destroyed. 
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 
lead to heavy fines and loss of reputation for the whole 
group. 
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 
lead to heavy fines and loss of reputation for the whole 
group. 
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 
lead to loss of reputation for the whole group. 
(7) Consequences
(8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity
Disclosure most probably will originate moderate 
fines. 
May originate legal fines
Significant loss of reputation is expected in case of 
service unavailability
No big impact is expected No big impact is expected No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected
Impact on store productivity due to unavailablity of certain devices
Productivity fall in case of encrypted servers/POS 
devices
After successful breach an attacker will most likely 
drop the database to harden the audit
No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 
lead to heavy fines and loss of reputation for the whole 
group. 
Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score
Relative Risk Score
Reduction of turnover is possible due to reputational loss Financial Loss due to lost sale oportunities
Reputational shock may reduce sales of S&G system.
No big impact is expected
Medium reputational loss due to solutions unavailability
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 
lead to loss of reputation for the whole group. 
No big impact is expected
May originate legal fines
Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score






















Dis Mod Dis Int Int
Hig Hig Hig Med Low
























































Productivity Medium 4 Productivity Medium 4 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6
Financial Medium 2 Financial High 3 Financial High 3 Financial High 3 Financial High 3
34 29 24 31 26









Dis Des Des Dis
Hig Med Low Low













































Productivity Medium 4 Productivity Medium 4 Productivity Medium 4 Productivity High 6
Financial High 3 Financial Medium 2 Financial Medium 2 Financial High 3
29 23 23 21
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 
lead to loss of reputation for the whole group. 
Significant productivity drop due necessary urgent bug fixes
Destruction of data will turn impossible certain type of sales through 
S&G
Disclosure will influence the competitive advantage 
organization has with this project
Relative Risk Score
No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected
Destruction of data will turn impossible certain type of 
sales through S&G
Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score
Relative Risk Score
Medium impact on functionality of S&G solution is expected, therefore 
leading to productivity and financial losses
High impact on productivity due to competitive 
advantage loss
Gaining access to BO application of Access Points will 
permit an attacker disabling or modifing functionality 
of equipment, thus turning service unoperational. 
Financial impact will be high due to customers drop as 
well. 
By making MH servers unreachable an attacker will 
drop the whole service pipeline. High productivity and 
financial impact. 
Medium impact on functionality of S&G solution is expected, therefore 
leading to productivity losses. High financial impact can be expected 
due to fraudulent oportunities which open to attacker High impact on financial side due to information leak 
to competitors
Relative Risk Score
High fines due to PCI requirements violation (collateral) No big impact is expected No big impact is expected No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected
Medium penaltis expected as collateral to such breach
No big impact is expected No big impact is expected No big impact is expected No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected
(7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity
(7) Consequences (8) Severity
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to heavy fines 
and loss of reputation for the whole group. 
High reputational impact due to network availability 
issues 
Unavailability will turn away certain ammount of 
active service customers (exact impact depends on 
unavailability time)
Upon becoming public fact may lead to heavy reputationa drop by 
unavalability of group to provide secure APP
(7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity
(6) Probability Low
(6) Probability Low
(6) Probability High (6) Probability Medium
(6) Probability High (6) Probability High (6) Probability High (6) Probability Medium






(4) Outcome Disclosure (4) Outcome Destruction















Lidl Software Development 


















A3R3 - S&G Network architecture disclosed
Reset of configuration/misconfiguration (2) Means
By using open ports/permissive 
filtering/active services
(2) Means
By sniffing insecure traffic between user 
device and Payment Terminal/Marketing 
Hub server due to weak encryption
(2) Means
Create a fake WiFi acess point and sniff 
the data / HTTP with weak keys
(2) Means
Gain access to LAN by using 
scale's TP connection (and 
spoofing its MAC address - 
optional)
(2) Means
Access AP management 















No big impact is expected
(3) Motive
App data collection, communication 
protocols, XML structures for espionage 
or own adwantage
(3) Motive
App data collection, communication 
protocols, XML structures for espionage 
or own adwantage
(3) Motive
Get access to secure store 
network, used for 
communication between 
devices; access files/databases 
(2) Means
Application code reveal by means of 
reversed engineering
























A3R5 - Unavailability of S&G Cloud Servers
(1) Actor External Attacker
(2) Means




Unintentional / Intentional will to harm 
the organization
(3) Motive Sabotage/ Revenge seeking (3) Motive
Interruption of service for 
sabotage purposes
(3) Motive
Replication of application for 
fraud/espionage purposes
A3R8 - S&G data lost due to ransomware
(1) Actor




































(1) Actor External/Internal Attacker (1) Actor Internal employee/Third party employee
(3) Motive Blackmail / Revenge seeking
(7) Consequences (8) Severity
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to loss of 
reputation
Medium impact is expected on sales drop, as data is 
backuped on weekly basis

































Internal / Third-Party employee with 
access to store LAN





























A3R9 - S&G data disclosed by IT staff
(1) Actor Internal Employee
(2) Means
Aware or unaware disclosure of 
information critical to project






(7) Consequences (8) Severity
No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected























Dis Mod Mod Int Int
Hig Hig Low Med Low
























































Productivity Medium 4 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6
Financial High 3 Financial High 3 Financial Medium 2 Financial High 3 Financial High 3
24 25 25 26 26
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Hig Hig Med Low













































Productivity Medium 4 Productivity Medium 4 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6
Financial High 3 Financial High 3 Financial High 3 Financial Medium 2
29 24 29 28
Significant productivity drop due necessary urgent bug fixes Significant productivity drop due necessary urgent price fixes
After successful breach an attacker will most likely 
drop the database to harden the audit
Relative Risk Score
No big impact is expected
Will impact cutomer confidence in medium terms 
(scale prices only)
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 
lead to loss of reputation for the whole group. 
No big impact is expected
May originate legal fines
Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score
After successful breach an attacker will most likely 
drop the database to harden the audit
High impact on financial side due to lost profits
High impact due to competitive loss
No big impact is expected No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected No big impact is expected No big impact is expected
(2) Means
Weak / Shared passwords. SNMP 
traffic between DBs and listeners
(3) Motive
Espionage / Blackmail on daily 


















A4R9 - Disclosure by accessing BO
(1) Actor
External Attacker / Internal 
Employee
(6) Probability Low
(7) Consequences (8) Severity
(5) Security 
Requirements
LIDL NI 3.2.2, LIDL ATA 3.1.7
Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score
No big impact is expected No big impact is expected May originate legal fines
In long run will lead to financial and productivity losses due to lost 
competitive advantage. 
High impact in both areas as substituting prices will lead to big losses 
and inventory problems
High impact on productivity due to additional job 
needed for restore Gaining access to scales management interface 
attacker may disable or modify individual scale, but 
repeat this process for other scales in shop
By making MH servers unreachable an attacker will 
drop the whole service pipeline. High productivity and 
financial impact. 
No big impact is expected No big impact is expected No big impact is expected No big impact is expected No big impact is expected
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact may lead to loss of 
customer reputation
No big impact is expected
Will impact cutomer confidence in medium terms 
(scale prices only)
Unavailability will turn away certain ammount of 
active service customers (exact impact depends on 
unavailability time)
Upon becoming public fact may lead to heavy reputationa drop by 
unavalability of group to provide secure APP
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will lead to loss of 
reputation
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact will 
lead to loss of reputation for the whole group. 
No big impact is expected
(7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences
(7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity
(7) Consequences (8) Severity
(6) Probability High (6) Probability Medium
(7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity












LIDL NI 3.2.2, LIDL ATA 3.1.7













LIDL NI 3.2.2, LIDL ATA 3.1.7
(5) Security 
Requirements
LIDL APP 3.2.5; Secure Development 
Best Practices
Use data for espionage or 
blackmail purposes
(4) Outcome Disclosure (4) Outcome Modification (4) Outcome Modification
(3) Motive
Intentional or unintentional 
sabotage
(3) Motive
Interruption of service for 
sabotage purposes
(3) Motive
Replication of application for 
fraud/espionage purposes
(3) Motive Espionage (3) Motive
Purchase expensive items for cheaper 
price
(3) Motive
Get access to secure store 
network, used for 
communication between 







(4) Outcome Modification (4) Outcome
By using BO application change of prices 
on national level intentionally or due to 
error of input
(2) Means
Highjack a priviledged user 
account / Use increased store 
infrastructure for LAN access
(1) Actor External attacker
(2) Means
By using flaws in protocol's security 
(HTTP) can see in clear text and request 
data from the server
(2) Means
Modify application code and modify item 
names locally. 
(2) Means
Gain access to LAN by using 
scale's TP connection (and 
spoofing its MAC address - 
optional)
(2) Means
By using defalt password / Login 





A4R8 - Exfiltration of promotion data
(1) Actor External attacker (1) Actor External Attacker (1) Actor External/Internal Attacker 
(3) Motive








































(1) Actor External/Internal Attacker (1) Actor Internal employee

















A4R5 - Prices unavailability
(1) Actor External Attacker
(2) Means
DDOS attack on publicly 
alllocated servers 
(2) Means
Application code reveal and modified by 
means of reversed engineering
(2) Means































May impact safety issues due to incorrect inventory I / O
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Productivity Medium 4 Productivity High 6 Productivity High 6 Productivity Low 2 Productivity Medium 4
Financial Medium 2 Financial High 3 Financial Medium 2 Financial Low 1 Financial Medium 2
29 21 20 31 23
No big impact is expected
High impact in both areas as access to this 
information will give larger autonomy to the attacker
Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score Relative Risk Score
In case of scandal, Client WiFi Infrastructure will have to be revisioned, 
which may lead to service stop
High impact in both areas as access to this information will give larger 
autonomy to the attacker
No big impact is expected
By making MH servers unreachable an attacker will 
restrict clients' access to the service
May lead to heavy fines in case LIDL name gets associated with illegal 
content access provisioning
Elevated fines in case the fact of storage becomes 
public
No big impact is expected
No big impact is expected No big impact is expected No big impact is expected
In case of disclosure and becoming public fact may lead to loss of 
customer reputation
High reputation drop in case fact of storage becomes 
public
Unavailability will turn away certain ammount of 
active service customers (exact impact depends on 
unavailability time)
(7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity(7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity (7) Consequences (8) Severity









National Content Regulations / Criminal 






LIDL APP 3.2.5 , LIDL CS 3.2.3
(4) Outcome Disclosure (4) Outcome Interruption(4) Outcome Disclosure (4) Outcome Disclosure (4) Outcome Modification
(2) Means
By using installed applications 
with known security issues
(3) Motive Unawereness / Negligence (3) Motive Blackmail / Reputational attack(3) Motive Use-as-proxy, Unawareness (3) Motive Unawereness / Negligence (3) Motive
Access to internal network to 
escalate privilidges and get 
access to information
A5R5 - Malware Distribution by fake WiFi AP

























































Downloaded or copied files which 
origin is illegal or compromising 
the organization
(2) Means
Usage of fake client AP to 
distribute malware 
(2) Means
































(1) Actor Client / Store Employee
(2) Means
Accessing illegar information through 
client WiFi AP
Discovey of Configuration/Backup Files 
with sensitive information on Network 
Shares by attacker
No big impact is expected
  
 







A1R1 - Client data is stolen by MitM attack type 26 
CIA 
Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS12 MS10     
A1R2 - Client data stolen by LWL-M WLAN crack 31 
CIA 
Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A1R3 - Client Data stolen by breaching store LAN 31 
CIA 
Priority High Mitigate MS11 MS10 MS13 MS14 
A1R4 - Client Data stolen by DB Crack 29 
CIA 
Priority High Mitigate MS07 MS09 MS08   
A1R5 - Employee data breach by BO access 29 
CIA 
Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS05       
A1R6 - Employee and Client data leaked 26 
CIA 
Priority High Mitigate/Defer MS14       
A1R7 - Client Data Destroyed 30 No Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS03 MS09     
A1R8 - Client data sniffed in between APP & Server 
Communication 28 
CIA 
Priority High Mitigate/Defer MS01 MS10 MS09   
A1R9 - Employee Data Modification 22 No Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A1R10 - Client Information unavailable 31 No Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A2R1 - Insecure Protocols in MBWay Implementation 31 No Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS01 MS02 MS10   
A2R2 - Payment data availability 24 No Priority High Mitigate/Defer MS06 MS17     
A2R3- Payment Data Availability 30 
CIA 
Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS11 MS10 MS13 MS14 
A2R4 - Payment Data lost due to DB crack 26 No Priority High Mitigate/Defer MS07 MS09 MS08   
A2R5 - PinPad physical substitution 31 No Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS08 MS03     
A2R6- CDE Interruption 22 No Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS13       
A2R7 - Phishing by providing false APP 31 No Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS02 MS10     
A2R8 - Disclosure by accessing BO 27 No Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A2R9 - Exfiltration of daily report data 27 No Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS11 MS10 MS13 MS14 
A1R10 - Client Information unavailable 31 No Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A3R1 - Insecure Protocols in MBWay Implementation 34 No Priority High Mitigate MS01 MS02     
A3R2 - Insecure Protocols in MBWay Implementation 29 
CIA 
Priority High Mitigate MS01 MS02     
A3R3 - SHOP&GO Network architecture disclosed 24 No Priority High Mitigate/Defer MS11 MS09     
A3R4 - SHOP&GO Network interruption 31 No Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS09 MS10     
A3R5 - Unavailability of GK Cloud Servers 26 No Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A3R6 - Application code revealed 29 No Priority High Mitigate MS04 MS10 MS01   
A3R7 - SHOP&GO configuration data destroyed 23 
CIA 
Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS16 MS15     
A3R8 - SHOP&GO data lost due to ransomware 23 
CIA 
Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A3R9 - SHOP&GO data disclosed by IT staff 21 No Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A4R1 - Regular Price dumps  24 No Priority High Mitigate/Defer MS01 MS10 MS09   
A4R2 - Switch item prices 25 No Priority High Mitigate/Defer MS01 MS02     
A4R3 - Price/Item Pictures modification 25 No Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A4R4 - Delete data on exposed devices 26 
CIA 
Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS09       
A4R5 - Prices unavailability 26 
CIA 
Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A4R6 - Application functionality modified 29 No Priority High Mitigate MS04 MS10 MS01   
A4R7 - Unintended price modification 24 No Priority High Mitigate/Defer MS09 MS11     
A4R8 - Exfiltration of promotion data 29 No Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS09 MS11 MS10 MS07 
A4R9 - Disclosure by accessing BO 28 No Priority Low Defer/Accept         
A5R1 - Unintended Guest Network Usage 29 
CIA 
Priority High Mitigate MS17       
A5R2 - Backup / Configuration files 21 
CIA 
Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS03 MS15 MS16   
A5R3 - Unnecessary Software / Lack of Hardening 20 No Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS08 MS07     
A5R4 - Illegal / Restricted information stored 31 
CIA 
Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS15 MS16     
A5R5 - Malware Distribution by fake WiFi AP 23 No Priority Medium Mitigate/Defer MS12 MS03     
 




Attachment VII – Measures and Containers 
Measure 
Id








































































































































































































Use TLS, All pages must be served over HTTPS, The HTTP Strict Transport Security Header must 
be used, Cookies must be marked as Secure X X X X 3 8
MS02 OWASP10 Use OWASP Top10 check / Guarantee AppSecurity through PenTest X X X X X X X 3 5
MS03 SIEM Use SIEM solution to detect intrusion / Use honeypots X X X X X 9 4
MS04 Code_Obfr Application’s code should be obfuscated, for example, with the ProGuard tool. X X 2 2
MS05 Data_Encr Store all GDPR compliant data encrypted X X X X X X X X X X X X X 8 1
MS06 Infrastructure Reinforce store infrastructure (add switching / routing devices) X 7 1
MS07 DB Hard Implement Database Hardening; When possible, disable default SYS-like accounts; X X X 5 4
MS08 Asset Mng
Inventory of applications, versions & owners. Implement or adjust a regular mechanism for 
installation of security updates. X X X X X X X X X X X 8 4
MS09 PSSWRD
Change all default passwords. Use password management software. Enforce the usage of strong 
passwords across all company X X X X X X X X X X X X X 5 10
MS10 Protocols
Configure and use encrypted protocols whenever possible. If encryption protocols are not available 
for some applications, evalu-ate the possibility of VPN usage X X X X X X X X X X X X X 5 12
MS11 Access Policies
Design and create access policies based on business needs and en-force it using firewalls or 
native filtering capabilities of network devices X X X X X X X 4 6
MS12 WIPS Implement a Wireless Intrusion Prevention System X X 8 2
MS13 Phys_Mon Implement Physical Security Monitoring X X X X* 7 4
MS14 CloudControl Use cenralized DB console for access control (e.g. Cloud Control) X X 5 4
MS15 Log Indexing Use Log-indexing system for version / patching checks X X X X X X X X X 9 3
MS16 Awareness Define and implement internal awareness programms by functional area X** 5 3
MS17 Traffic filter Implement trafic filter / DNS blacklist X X X 4 2
*physical security of app-related info, QR codes in shop, dow nload links etc. 
**aw arness programms for store employees, related to solution security
ContainersSuggested Measures
